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Gould and White [1974] show how "mental maps" of countries
can be constructed. These maps can represent many facets of
individual attitudes (preference, ignorance, prejudice, etc.).
Once an individual preference structure has been constructed,
Gould and White describe a technique for aggregating the pref-
erences of individuals into "national" or "regional" preferences.
Thus they illustrate the mental map of school leavers at Bristol,
Aberystwyth, Liverpool, and Inverness over the preference
for location in Great Britain (p.71 to 80), as well as maps for
the United States for different regions. These maps are aggre-
gations of individual maps, or preference structures. The tech-
nique used for constructing maps is to start with an ordinal
preference map for individuals, then by the technique of factor
analysis to combine or weight the individual preferences into
an "aggregate preference structure".
One might start off by quibbling with the use of factor
analysis to construct the aggregate preference structure. Why
not use simply averages of the preferences rather than averages
where the weights are determined by the factor loadings? There
is, however, a deeper reason to question the technique, and that
is simply that under the normal definition of a map, or a prefer-
ence surface, aggregate mental maps cannot be constructed.
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To see why, we need to ask, what are the normal qualities
which we associate with a map of a preference surface? We call
them the AXIOMS OF MENTAL CARTOGRAPHY. First, it must be a complete
map of the region. Second, it must be a transitive map, indicating
that if region A is higher than region B and region B is higher
than region C, then A must be higher than C. Third, when comparing
two regions we assume that the height of a town is independent of
the height of other towns; thus to compare the height of Baden
and Vienna, we need not know the height of Laxenburg. Fourth,
these maps must be meaningful aggregates in the sense that they
reflect the tastes of more than one or two persons; thus, let us
say that if at least half the people think A is higher than B, then
the aggregate must also show A to be higher than B.
Under these innocuous conditions, it is easy to show that
aggregate mental maps cannot be generally constructed. A simple
example will make the process clear: let us have three individuals
(A, B, C) and three locations (Vienna, Baden, and Laxenburg).
The ranking of the three towns is as follows:
Person
A
B
C
Baden
1
2
3
Laxenburg
3
1
2
Vienna
2
3
1
where a higher number indicates less preferred locations. Thus
A prefers Baden over other locations.
In this example, by rule 4, we have Laxehburg is higher
(more preferred) than Baden, Baden higher than Vienna, and
Vienna higher than Laxenburg. Thus in this example any map
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satisfying rule 4 will violate rule 2.
Perhaps the example is very special and nasty. When in
general can we construct a map consistent with the axioms of
mental cartography? We can where two conditions are met:
first, we must be able to cut up a map so that it is, topo-
logically, a piece of spaghetti. Second, we must then be able
to represent each individual's mental map so that the altitude
on the piece of spaghetti rises monotonically from the ocean
to a continental divide, then falls monotonically to the ocean.
Not everyone need have the same continent divide, but everyone
must use the same piece of spaghetti. When the Spaghetti and
Continental Divide conditions are met, then an aggregate mental
map can be constructed which satisfy the Axioms of Mental Carto-
graphy. For a proof we can apply the reasoning of Arrow [1951]
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